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Abstract
Derivatives activity, motivated by risksharing, can breed risktaking. Bad news
about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability
of a protection seller and undermines her riskprevention incentives. This limits risk
sharing, and may create endogenous counterparty risk and contagion from news about
the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad
news can improve protection sellersincentives and enhance the ability to share risk.
Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed
to preserve riskprevention incentives.
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1 Introduction
Derivatives activity has grown strongly over the past fteen years. For example, credit default
swaps (CDS), bilateral over-the-counter contracts used to insure credit risk, alone saw total
notional amounts outstanding increase from around $180 billion in 1998 to a peak of over
$60 trillion by mid-2008 (Acharya et al., 2012). But the insurance provided by derivatives
is e¤ective only if counterparties can honor their contractual obligations and do not default.
When Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy protection in September 2008, it froze the
positions of more than 900,000 derivative contracts (about 5% of all derivative transactions
globally) in which Lehman Brothers was a party (Fleming and Sarkar, 2014). The sudden
awareness of the possibility of counterparty risk in derivatives and of the associated loss of
protection marked the beginning of the global nancial crisis.
What are the interactions between counterpartyrisk and derivatives activity? Can risk-
sharing via derivatives perversely lead to risktaking by nancial institutions? How can
derivatives activity be made more resilient to risk? In this paper, we explain how derivatives
positions a¤ect risktaking incentives. We show how margin deposits and clearing arrange-
ments can be designed to mitigate counterparty risk. We provide new empirical predictions
about the extent of derivatives activity in a given nancial environment and the default risk
of institutions selling protection through derivatives.
Our model features risk-averse protection buyers who want to insure against a common
exposure to risk (any idiosyncratic component of risk can be diversied among protection
buyers themselves). To insure the common risk, they contact risk-neutral protection sellers
whose assets are risky, but who are not directly exposed to the risk buyers want to insure.
Because of limited liability, protection sellers can make insurance payments only if their
assets are su¢ ciently valuable. The value of a protection sellers assets is a¤ected by her
actions. Specically, we assume protection sellers can prevent downside risk, and hence
maintain a su¢ cient value for their assets, by exerting costly e¤ort. For example, when
choosing their investments they can carefully scrutinize their quality. Instead of careful and
costly own scrutiny, protection sellers can shirkand avoid the cost by relying on external,
ready-made credit ratings or simple backwardlooking measures of risk, as pointed out by
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). A failure of protection sellers to exert the risk-prevention e¤ort
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(which we call risk-taking) leads to counterparty risk for protection buyers. Since nancial
institutionsbalance-sheets and activities are opaque and complex, lack of risk-prevention
e¤ort is di¢ cult to observe and to detect for outsiders. This creates a moral hazard problem
for protection sellers, the key friction in our model.
Our model builds on two important characteristics of derivatives activity. First, during
the life of a derivative contract, new information about the value of the underlying asset
becomes available. Such news a¤ect the expected pay-o¤s of the contracting parties: it
makes the derivative position an asset for one party and a liability for the other. Second,
derivative exposures, and hence the associated potential liabilities, can be large. According
to the Quarterly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities by the O¢ ce of the Comptroller of
the Currency, total credit exposure from derivatives reached more than $1.5 trillion in 2008.1
The total credit exposure of the top ve nancial institutions was two to ten times larger
than their risk-based capital.
A key insight of our analysis is that a large derivative exposure undermines a protection
sellers incentives to exert the risk-prevention e¤ort when news makes the derivative position
an expected liability for her. In that case, she bears the full cost of the risk-prevention e¤ort
while the benet of this e¤ort partly accrues to her counterparty in the form of payments
from the derivative contract. This is reminiscent of debt-overhang (Myers, 1977) but there
is an important di¤erence. In our analysis, the liability arises endogenously in the context
of an optimal contract and it only materializes when negative news occur.
The optimal contract takes one of two forms, depending on the severity of the moral-
hazard problem. Either the contract maintains protection sellersriskprevention incentives,
but this comes at the cost of less exante risk-sharing for protection buyers. Or it promises
more risksharing but gives up on riskprevention incentives, which creates counterparty risk
for protection buyers. Thus, our rst contribution is to show how the risk-sharing potential
from derivatives contracts is limited either by just the potential or the actual presence of
endogenous counterparty risk.
1Total credit exposure is the sum total of net current credit exposure (NCCE) and potential future
exposure (PFE). NCCE is the gross positive fair value of derivatives contracts less the dollar amount of
netting benets. PFE is an estimate of what the current credit exposure could be over time, based upon a
supervisory formula in the risk-based capital rules.
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Our second contribution is to identify a channel through which derivatives activity can
propagate risk. Without moral hazard, we assume for simplicity that the pay-o¤s from
protection seller assets and from protection buyer assets are independent. In contrast, with
moral hazard, bad news about protection buyer assets can increase the likelihood of low pay-
o¤s from protection seller assets, because bad news undermine the protection sellers risk
prevention incentives. Moral-hazard in derivatives activity can therefore generate contagion
(endogenous correlation) between two, otherwise unrelated, asset classes.
For example, prior to the recent crisis commercial banks frequently reduced their capital
requirements by purchasing derivatives.2 A bank exposed to sub-prime mortgages could
purchase CDS on those mortgages and save on regulatory capital. Conditional on the drop
in real estate prices (which started well in advance of the crisis), those CDS contracts became
expected liabilities for those institutions that sold them, typically investment banks. Our
model predicts that nancial institutions with larger short CDS positions exposed their
balance sheets more to downside risks as bad news about the housing market emerged.
This creates correlation between the mortgage values and the values of nancial institutions
assets without direct exposure to mortgage default. By contrast, those same institutions
would not have increased their risk exposure after good news about the housing market.
Importantly, in our model the exposure to downside risk is not the consequence of mistakes
or incompetence. It is a calculated choice of trading-o¤ exante risk-sharing and downside
risk exposure after bad news.
The third contribution of our paper is to characterize the optimal design of margin calls
and central clearing, two institutional arrangements that aim to mitigate counterparty risk in
derivatives activity. Both margins and central clearing received much focus in the regulatory
overhaul of nancial markets in the aftermath of the nancial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act in the U.S. and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation in Europe
require certain derivative trades to occur via central clearing platforms (CCPs). There is,
however, still considerable debate about the optimal design of CCPs for derivatives (see, e.g.,
Dudley, 2014, and Economist, 2014).
To examine the e¤ects of central clearing, our model features a CCP that interposes
272% of the CDS AIG had sold by December 2007 were used by banks for capital relief (European Central
Bank, 2009).
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between protection buyers and sellers. The benet of the CCP is that it mutualizes the
idiosyncratic part of counterparty risk. In a bilateral contract, each protection buyer is
exposed to the counterparty risk of his own protection seller. The CCP instead pools the
resources from all protection sellers. Any losses from the default of individual sellers are
therefore shared across all protection buyers.
The CCP is also in charge of implementing margin calls. We emphasize the incentive role
of margins. The party subject to a margin call has to deposit assets with the CCP. She no
longer has control over the deposited assets, which are therefore ring-fenced from moral
hazard. Risk-prevention e¤ort only concerns the remaining, now smaller fraction of assets
over which she still has control. The cost of risk-prevention e¤ort is therefore lower, which
improves risk-prevention incentives. While ringfencing is the benet of margins, it comes at
a cost. The loss of control goes hand-in-hand with a loss of income. Safe assets on a margin
account earn a lower return than risky assets left on nancial institutionsbalance-sheets.
Margins will therefore be used only when the ring-fencing benet outweighs their cost, e.g.,
when the moral hazard problem is severe, or when the opportunity cost of depositing assets
in the margin account is not too large.
Our analysis implies margins can be an attractive substitute to equity capital. Margins
improve incentives by making the asset side of the balance sheet less susceptible to moral-
hazard. With less moral-hazard, the assets can support larger liabilities. Consequently,
margins allow protection sellers to engage in incentive-compatible derivative trading with
less equity. An advantage of margins is their contingent nature. They are called only when
individual derivative positions deteriorate.
Our mechanism design approach claries how two important reform proposals to make
derivative markets more resilient, namely margins and central clearing, interact and need to
be designed together. While central clearing allows mutualizing counterparty risk, margins
provide incentives to avoid counterparty risk. Without margins, CCPs would bear too much
risk and without a CCP, contracting parties would have to put up higher margins. And
it is the CCP who must design and mandate the margin calls. Otherwise, there would be
free-riding on the insurance it o¤ers.
Our model also generates new, testable implications. First, we predict that derivatives
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contracts that o¤er ample insurance but increase exposure to downside risk (of protection
sellers) are likely to be underwritten in a benignmacroeconomic and nancial environ-
ment. Second, the relation between derivatives exposures and the pledgeability of a nancial
institutions assets (measured, e.g., by the e¢ ciency of its risk-management practices) is
U-shaped. Financial institutions with an intermediate level of risk-management e¢ ciency
choose small derivatives exposures while nancial institutions on the other two sides of e¢ -
ciency spectrum choose large exposures. Third, optimal margins are higher when i) risk-free
rates are high compared to the return on productive investment opportunities, and ii) risk-
management costs increase strongly with the amount of assets under management.
While the nancial insurance literature typically focuses on moral hazard on the part
of the buyer of protection,3 Thompson (2010) assumes moral hazard on the part of the
seller of protection. Our analysis shares this feature with that of Thompson (2010), but
the two papers consider very di¤erent informationasymmetry problems. In particular, in
our analysis, in contrast with Thompson (2010), moral hazard impedes the provision of
insurance.
Bolton and Oehmke (2013) rely on a modeling framework similar to ours but consider
di¤erent issues. They show that e¤ective seniority for derivatives transfers credit risk to the
rms debtholders that could be borne more e¢ ciently by the derivative market.
Acharya and Bisin (2011) analyze the externalities arising between several protection
buyers contracting with the same protection seller. They show how centralized clearing can
internalize externalities among protection buyers, via optimally designed pricing schedules.
This di¤ers from our moral hazard setting where externalities are not a key issue, and
quantities as well as prices must be controlled to restore incentives.4
Our paper explains how derivatives activity, through its e¤ect on incentives, can gen-
erate contagion between asset classes whose risk is independent in the absence of incentive
problems. This novel form of contagion channel adds to the literature on shock propaga-
tion, which emphasized interregional nancial connections (Allen and Gale, 2000, Freixas,
3See, e.g., Parlour and Plantin (2008) in the context of credit risk transfer in banking.
4In the context of a model with dividend externalities among interconnected banks, Acharya et al. (2013)
show how margin and capital requirements imposed by clearing-houses make banks internalize costs of their
default on each other.
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Parigi and Rochet, 2000), information contagion (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007, King and
Wadhwani, 1990) and re sales (Allen and Carletti, 2006, Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin,
2005).
Margins can be interpreted as a form of collateral. Collateral is usually analyzed in mod-
els in which agents borrow to nance investments (see, e.g, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011)). Our paper o¤ers the rst
analysis of the incentives role of collateral in derivatives trading. This new context brings
about new features that set margins apart from standard collateral. Standard collateral,
say a house that backs up a mortgage, is transferred from the borrower to the creditor after
decisions have been taken and pay-o¤s are realized, e.g., when the borrower defaults. By
contrast, margin calls in our analysis, as in derivatives markets, occur before contracts ma-
ture, i.e., nal pay-o¤s are realized, and, importantly, before e¤ort and risktaking decisions
are made.
Our modelling of moral hazard, where the agent chooses between e¤ort and shirking
is in line with Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998), and we borrow from their analysis the
terminology pledgeable income, to refer to the future output that can be promised by
the agent without jeopardizing her incentives. In our setting, however, incentives can be
undermined by the arrival of information about the risk underlying the derivative contract
before e¤ort decisions are made, and this problem can be mitigated with margin calls. These
key features of our model are absent from the standard moralhazard model studied in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
2, which also analyzes the benchmark case in which there is no moralhazard problem.
Section 3 analyzes optimal contracting under moral hazard. Section 4 presents extensions
and discusses robustness. Section 5 contains empirical implications and Section 6 policy
implications of our analysis. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 Model and FirstBest Benchmark
2.1 The model
There are three dates, t = 0; 1; 2, a massone continuum of protection buyers, a massone
continuum of protection sellers and a Central Clearing Platform, hereafter referred to as the
CCP. At t = 0, the parties design and enter the contract. At t = 1, investment decisions are
made. At t = 2, payo¤s are received.
Players and assets. Protection buyers are identical, with twice di¤erentiable concave
utility function u, and are endowed with one unit of an asset with random return ~ at t = 2.5
For simplicity, we assume ~ can only take on two values:  with probability  and  with
probability 1   , and we denote  =    . The risk ~ is the same for all protection
buyers.6
Protection buyers seek insurance against the risk ~ from protection sellers who are risk-
neutral and have limited liability. Each protection seller j has an initial amount of cash A.
At time t = 1, this initial balance sheet can be split between two types of assets: i) low
risk, low return assets such as Treasuries (with return normalized to 1), and ii) risky assets
returning ~Rj per unit at t = 2. The protection seller has unique skills (unavailable to the
protection buyer or the CCP) to manage the risky assets and earn excess return. After this
initial investment allocation decision, the protection seller makes a risk-management decision
at t = 1. To model risk-management in the simplest possible way, we assume that each seller
j can undertake a costly e¤ort to make her assets safer. If she undertakes the e¤ort, the per
unit return ~Rj is R with probability one. If she does not exert the e¤ort, then the return
is R with probability p < 1 and zero with probability 1   p. The risk-management process
reects the unique skills of the protection seller and is therefore di¢ cult to observe and
monitor by outside parties. Combined with limited liability, e¤ort unobservability generates
moralhazard.
5The concavity of the objective function of the protection buyer can reect institutional, nancial or
regulatory constraints, such as leverage constraints or riskweighted capital requirements. For an explicit
modeling of hedging motives see Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). Rampini and Viswanatan (2010)
examine how a rms hedging policy interacts with its nancing policy in a dynamic context.
6At the cost of unnecessarily complicating the analysis, we could also assume that the risk has an idio-
syncratic component. This component would not be important as protection buyers could hedge this risk
among themselves, without seeking insurance from protection sellers.
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Exerting the e¤ort costs C per unit of assets under management at t = 1.7 Because
protection seller assets are riskier without costly e¤ort, we also refer to the decision not to
exert e¤ort as risk-taking.8 Undertaking risk-management e¤ort is e¢ cient,
R  C > pR; (1)
i.e., the expected net return is larger with risk-management e¤ort than without it. We also
assume that when protection seller exerts risk management e¤ort, return on his assets is
higher than the return on the safe asset,
R  C > 1; (2)
For simplicity, conditional on e¤ort, ~Rj is independent across sellers and independent of
protection buyersrisk ~. To allow protection sellers that exert e¤ort to fully insure buyers,
we assume AR  .
Advance information. At the beginning of t = 1, before investment and risk manage-
ment decisions are made, a public signal ~s about protection buyersrisk ~ is observed. For
example, when ~ is the credit risk of realestate portfolios, ~s can be the realestate price
index. Denote the conditional probability of a correct signal by
 = prob[sj] = prob[sj]:
The probability  of a good outcome  for the protection buyers risk is updated to  upon
observing a good signal s and to  upon observing a bad signal s, where, by Bayeslaw,
 = prob[js] = 
 + (1  )(1  ) and  = prob[
js] = (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) :
We assume that   1
2
. If  = 1
2
, then  =  =  and the signal is completely
uninformative. If  > 1
2
, then  >  > , i.e., observing a good signal s increases the
probability of a good outcome  whereas observing a bad signal s decreases the probability
of a good outcome . If  = 1 the signal is perfectly informative.
7We show later that our results are unchanged when we allow the unit cost C to increase (linearly) with
assets under management, which makes the overall cost of risk-management e¤ort convex.
8Here risk-management e¤ort improves returns in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. In an
earlier version of the paper we show that our results are robust when e¤ort improves returns in the sense of
secondorder stochastic dominance, so that lack of e¤ort corresponds to riskshifting.
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Central counterparty, contracts and margins.
In practice, protection buyers and protections sellers contract bilaterally, and the CCP
then interposes between contracting parties. Thus, the contract between the protection
buyer and protection seller is transformed into two contracts, one between the seller and
the CCP and another one between the buyer and the CCP (a process called novation).
In our model, for simplicity, we by-pass the rst step (bilateral contracting), and analyze
directly the contracts between the CCP and protection buyers and sellers. This enables us
to approach the problem from a mechanism design viewpoint in which the CCP designs an
optimal mechanism for buyers and sellers.
Correspondingly, the CCP is modeled as a public utility designed to maximize the welfare
of its members (i.e., it acts as the social planner). For simplicity, we assume the CCP
maximizes expected utility of protection buyers subject to the participation constraint of
the protection sellers.9
At t = 0, the CCP species transfers S between protection sellers and the CCP at
t = 2, and transfers B between protection buyers and the CCP at t = 2. Positive transfers
S; B > 0 represent payments from the CCP to sellers and buyers, while negative transfers
represent payments from sellers and buyers to the CCP. The transfers S and B at t = 2
are contingent on all available information at that time. This information consists of the
buyersrisk ~, the signal ~s and the set of all the protections sellersasset returns ~R. Hence,
we write S(~; ~s; ~R) and S(~; ~s; ~R). Since the transfers are contingent on nal asset values
as well as advance public information about those values (that could be conveyed, e.g., by
asset prices), we can think of them as transfers specied by derivative contracts.
The transfers between the CCP and its members reect the initial underlying bilateral
contract, which is novated, and mutualization across all bilateral contracts. Hence, the
transfers depend not only on a protection seller individual asset return ~Rj, as would be the
case in a bilateral contract without the CCP, but depend on all sellers asset returns ~R.
This is because the latter a¤ect the amount of resources available to the CCP to insure its
members against counterparty risk.
9While this is only one point on the Pareto frontier, in the rst-best all other Pareto optima would entail
the same real decisions, i.e., the same risksharing and productive e¢ ciency. In the second-best, changing
the bargaining does not alter our qualitative results.
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Figure 1 illustrates how the CCP sits in between protection buyers and sellers.
Insert Figure 1 here
The contract between the CCP and its members not only species transfers, it can also
request margin deposits. Because the CCP has no ability to manage risky, opaque assets,
it only accepts as margin deposits safe, transparent ones, such as cash or Treasuries that
are not subject to information asymmetry problems.10 One can therefore interpret margins
as an institutional arrangement that a¤ects the time1 split of the sellers balance sheet
between transparent assets and opaque investments. Margins ring-fencea fraction of the
protection sellersassets from moral-hazard. However, margins incur the opportunity cost of
foregoing the excess return of the risky asset, R  C   1. The margin can be contingent on
all information available at time 1, i.e., the signal ~s. We denote the fraction of the protection
sellers balance sheet deposited on the margin account by (~s).
The CCP is subject to budget-balance, or feasibility, constraints at t = 2. For each joint
realization of buyersrisk ~, the signal ~s and sellersasset returns ~R, aggregate transfers to
protection buyers cannot exceed aggregate transfers from protection sellers (the CCP has no
resources of its own):
B(; s; R)   S(; s; R); 8(; s; R): (3)
Transfers from protection sellers are constrained by limited liability,
 S(; s; R)  (s)A+ (1  (s))AR; 8(; s; R): (4)
A protection seller cannot make transfers larger than what is returned by the fraction (1 
(s)) of assets under her management and by the fraction (s) of assets she deposited on
the margin account. Finally, the fraction of assets deposited must be between zero and one,
(s) 2 [0; 1] 8s: (5)
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
10That assets with low information sensitivity are used as collateral is in line with Gorton and Pennacchi
(1990).
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2.2 First-best: observable e¤ort
In this subsection we consider the case in which protection sellersrisk-management e¤ort is
observable, so that there is no moral hazard and the rst-best is achieved. While implausible,
this case o¤ers a benchmark against which we will identify the ine¢ ciencies arising when
protection sellers risk-management e¤ort is not observable.
Protection sellers are requested to exert risk-management e¤ort when o¤ering protection
since doing so increases the resources available for risk-sharing (see (1)). Margins are not
used since they are costly (see (2)) and o¤er no benet when risk-management e¤ort is
observable. The CCP chooses transfers to buyers and sellers, B(~; ~s; ~R) and S(~; ~s; ~R), to
maximize buyersutility
E[u(~ + B(~; ~s; ~R)] (6)
subject to the feasibility (3) and limited liability (4) constraints, as well as the constraint
that protection sellers participate and join the CCP. By joining (and exerting e¤ort), sellers
obtain E[S(~; ~s; ~R)] + A(R   C). If they do not join and thus do not sell protection, they
obtain A(R C).11 The protection sellersparticipation constraint in the rst-best therefore
is
E[S(~; ~s; ~R)]  0: (7)
Proposition 1 states the rst-best outcome. Since protection sellers exert risk-management
e¤ort, the return ~R is always equal to R and we drop the reference to the return in the trans-
fers B and S for ease of notation.
Proposition 1 When e¤ort is observable, the optimal contract entails e¤ort, provides full
insurance, is actuarially fair and does not react to the signal. Margins are not used. The
transfers are given by
B(; s) = B(; s) = E[~]   =   (1  )  < 0
B(; s) = B(; s) = E[~]   =  > 0
B(; s) =  S(; s);8(; s)
11Without derivative trading, protection sellers always exert e¤ort since it is e¢ cient to do so (see condition
(2)).
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The rst-best contract fully insures protection buyers. Their marginal utility, and hence
their consumption, is the same across all realizations of their risky asset  and the signal
s. The transfers are independent of the signal and ensure a consumption level equal to the
expected value of the risky asset, E[~]. The rst-best insurance contract is actuarially fair
since the expected transfer from protection sellers to protection buyers is zero, E[B(~; ~s)] =
 E[S(~; ~s)] = 0. We assume
AR > ; (8)
so that, in the rstbest, the aggregate resources of the protection sellers are large enough
to fully insure the protection buyers.
In our simple model, when e¤ort is observable, each transfer to a protection buyer B is
matched by an opposite transfer from a protection seller and margins are not needed. Thus
the contract can be implemented bilaterally and the CCP is not needed. Of course, this
reects our simplifying assumption that, under e¤ort, R is obtained for sure. If protection
sellers could default, even with high e¤ort, the CCP would be useful, in the rst best, to
mutualize default risk. As shown in the next sections, even in the simple case where e¤ort
precludes default, with moral hazard, the CCP plays a useful role.
The rst best transfers, B(; s) and S(; s), can be implemented with forward contracts.
The protection buyer sells the underlying asset forward, at price F = E[~]. When the nal
value of the asset is worth , the protection buyer must deliver at the relatively low forward
price F . But, when the nal value of the asset is low , the forward price is relatively high.
This provides insurance to the protection buyer.
While we only consider transfers at t = 2, and not explicitly at t = 1, this is without
loss of generality, because any other trading arrangement can be replicated with transfers
at t = 2 and margins. Consider for example spot trading in which at t = 1, before the
realization of the signal, the protection seller uses some of his initial assets A to acquire
the protection buyersasset at price S. Because there is no discounting, this is equivalent
for the protection buyer to a constant transfer S at time 2. This can be achieved within
the mechanism we analyze, by depositing S on the margin account at t = 1 and letting
B(; s) = S, irrespective of the realization of  and s. Proposition 1 shows, however, that
this is dominated by forward trading. Forward trading is more e¢ cient, because it makes it
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possible to keep the assets under the management of the protection seller until t = 2 and
earn a larger return (R  C) than when investing in the risk free asset.
3 Protection-seller moral-hazard
In the previous section, we examined the hypothetical case in which protection sellersrisk-
management e¤ort is observable and can therefore be requested by protection buyers. We
now move on to the more realistic situation in which risk-management e¤ort is not observable
and there is moral-hazard on the side of protection sellers.
If protection buyers want protection sellers to exert risk-management e¤ort, then it must
be in sellersown interest to do so after observing the signal s about buyersrisk ~. The
incentive compatibility constraint under which a protection seller exerts e¤ort after observing
s is:
E[S(~; ~s; ~R) + (~s)A+(1  (~s))A( ~R  C)je = 1; ~s = s]
 E[S(~; ~s; ~R) + (~s)A+ (1  (~s))A ~Rje = 0; ~s = s]:
The left-hand side is a protection sellers expected payo¤ if she exerts risk-management e¤ort.
The e¤ort costs C per unit of assets she still controls, (1   (s))A. The right-hand side is
her (out-of-equilibrium) expected payo¤ if she does not exert e¤ort and therefore does not
incur the cost C.
Without e¤ort, her assets under management return R with probability p and zero with
probability 1   p. In order to relax the incentive constraint, the CCP requests the largest
possible transfer from a protection seller when ~R = 0:  S(~; ~s; 0) = (~s)A. This rationalizes
the stylized fact that, in case of default of the protection seller, the CCP seizes her deposits
and uses them to pay protection buyers.
With e¤ort, the protection sellers assets under management are safe, with ~R = R. For
brevity, we write S(~; ~s; R) as S(~; ~s). The incentive constraint after observing s is then
E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] + (s)A+(1  (s))A(R  C)
 p

E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] + (s)A+ (1  (s))AR

;
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or, using the notion of pledgeable returnP (see Tirole, 2006),
P  R  C
1  p; (9)
the incentive compatibility constraint rewrites as
(s)A+ (1  (s))AP  E[ S(~; ~s)j~s = s]: (10)
The righthand side is what protection sellers expect to pay to the CCP after seeing the
signal about buyers risk.12 The left-hand side is the amount that protection sellerscan
pay (or pledge) to the CCP without undermining their incentive to exert risk-management
e¤ort. The left-hand side is positive since the assumption that e¤ort is e¢ cient, condition (1),
ensures positive pledgeable return, P > 0. The righthand side is positive when, conditional
on the signal, a protection seller expects, on average, to make transfers to the CCP. If
after seeing the signal she expects, on average, to receive transfers from the CCP, then the
right-hand side is negative and the incentive constraint does not bind. This is an important
observation to which we return later.
When the pledgeable return P is su¢ ciently high, then protection sellersincentive prob-
lem does not matter because the rst-best allocation (stated in Proposition 1) satises the
incentive-compatibility constraint (10) after any signal. The exact condition is given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 When riskmanagement e¤ort is not observable, the rst-best can be achieved if
and only if the pledgeable return on assets is high enough:
AP  (   ) = E[~]  E[~j~s = s]: (11)
The threshold for the pledgeable return on assets, beyond which full risk-sharing is pos-
sible despite protection seller moral-hazard, is given by the di¤erence between the uncondi-
tional expectation of buyersrisk ~ and the conditional expectation of this risk after a low
signal (indicating a bad outcome is more likely). The threshold increases, making it more
12In our simple model this promised payment reects a single trade. With multiple trades, the relevant
expected payment would reect the net exposure of the protection seller. In addition, when several trades
are conducted with several counterparties, contractual externalities may arise. In this context a potential
benet of centralized clearing is to internalize externalities (see Acharya and Bisin, 2013).
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di¢ cult to attain the rst-best, when buyersassets are riskier (larger ) and, interestingly,
when there is better information about this risk (larger  leading to a lower ). Thus, Lemma
1 has the following corollary.
Corollary 1 When the signal is uninformative,  = 1
2
, the rst-best is always reached since
(   ) = 0.
In what follows, we focus on the case in which protection seller moral-hazard matters
and full insurance is not feasible, as (11) does not hold.
3.1 E¤ort after both signals
In this section, we study the contract providing the protection seller the incentives to exert
risk-management e¤ort both after positive and after negative signals. While margins were
not useful without moral-hazard (as discussed in Subsection 2.2), they may be useful now.
When a protection seller exerts risk-management e¤ort after both signals, her participation
constraint is
E[(~s)A+ (1  (~s))A( ~R  C) + S(~; ~s; ~R)je = 1]  A(R  C):
Since, on the equilibrium path, the protection sellers exert e¤ort, we have ~R = R and again,
for brevity, we write the transfer to a protection seller as S(~; ~s). Collecting terms, the
participation constraint is
E[S(~; ~s)]  E[(~s)]A(R  C   1); (12)
The expected transfers from the CCP to a protection seller (left-hand-side) must be high
enough to compensate her for the opportunity cost of the expected use of margins (right-
hand-side). Thus, if margins are used, the contract is not actuarially fair.
The CCP chooses transfers to protection buyers B(~; ~s) and protection sellers, S(~; ~s),
as well as margins (~s), to maximize buyersutility (6) subject to the feasibility constraints
(3), the constraint that the fraction  be in [0; 1] (5), and the incentive (10), limited liability
(4), and participation (12) constraints.
The next proposition collects rst results on how resources are optimally transferred
between protection sellers and protection buyers.
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Proposition 2 In the optimal contract with risk-management e¤ort, the feasibility con-
straints (3) bind for all (; s), the limited liability constraints (4) are slack in state (; s) for
each s, and the participation constraint (12) binds.
Protection sellers earn no rents and all resources available for insurance are passed on
to protection buyers. Protection sellerslimited liability is not an issue when the value of
the protection buyersasset is , since in that state risk-sharing implies positive transfers to
protection sellers.
Using the binding feasibility constraints, we can rewrite the incentive constraint (10) as
 (s)A+ (1   (s))AP  E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] (13)
Incentive compatibility implies that the expected transfers to the protection buyer be no
larger than the sum of the returns on i) the assets deposited on the margin account and on
ii) those left under the protetction sellers management. The pledgeable return on assets
under management is smaller than the physical net return, P < R   C, because there is
moral hazard when exerting e¤ort to manage the risk of those assets. The pledgeable return
on assets deposited on the margin account is equal to their physical return of one since they
are ring-fencedfrom moral-hazard in risk-management. When the moral hazard is severe,
P < 1, then depositing assets on the margin account relaxes the incentive constraint and
thus allows for higher transfers to protection buyers. This is the benet of margins. But
assets deposited on the margin account incur an opportunity cost R   C   1 to protection
sellers. This basic tradeo¤ leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the optimal contract with risk-management e¤ort, margins are not used
after s if the incentive constraint given s is slack or if the moral-hazard is not severe, i.e.,
P  1.
When the incentive constraint after s is slack, then depositing assets on the margin
account o¤ers no incentive benet and only incurs the opportunity cost. When the pledgeable
return of assets under management (weakly) exceeds the pledgeable return of assets deposited
on the margin account, then margins also do not o¤er any incentive benet since they actually
tighten the incentive constraint.
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To keep the next steps of the analysis tractable, we make the following simplifying as-
sumption:
AR >    prob[s]
prob[s]
AP ; (14)
The assumption guarantees, as we will show, a slack limited liability constraint for trans-
fers from a protection seller to the CCP when there is a good signal, s, but buyersasset
return is low, . We discuss this assumption in more detail once we have solved for the opti-
mal transfers, B(~; ~s) and S(~; ~s). Given (14) and Proposition 2, we only need to consider
the limited liability constraint in state (; s).
The next proposition states that moral-hazard problem matters only after a bad signal.
Proposition 4 In the optimal contract with risk-management e¤ort, the incentive constraint
(13) binds after a bad signal, but is slack after a good signal. Hence there is no margin call
after a good signal, i.e., (s) = 0.
After observing a bad signal about the underlying risk, a protection sellers position
is a liability to her, E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] < 0. This undermines her incentives to exert risk-
management e¤ort. She has to bear the full cost of e¤ort while the benet of staying solvent
accrues in part to protection buyers in the form of the (likely) transfer to the CCP. This is
in line with the debt-overhang e¤ect (Myers, 1977).
In contrast, there is no moral-hazard problem for a protection seller after observing a
good signal. A good signal indicates that her position is an asset at this point of time,
E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] > 0. This strengthens her incentives to exert risk-management e¤ort. In a
sense, after a good signal, since the protection sellers position has become an asset for her,
it increases the income she can pledge. In contrast, the loss she expects after a bad signal
reduces her pledgeable income.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal contract between the CCP, protection
buyers and protections seller that exert risk management e¤ort. It is convenient to rst
characterize optimal transfers as a function of the margin after a bad signal, (s), and later
examine the optimal margin call after a bad signal. Expected transfers conditional on the
signal (as a function of (s)) are given by the binding participation constraint (Proposition
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2) and the incentive constraint after a bad signal (Proposition 4),
E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] = A [(s) + (1  (s))P ] (15)
E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] =  prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ] (16)
The next proposition characterizes the transfers in each possible state:
Proposition 5 The transfers to protection buyers are
B(; s) = (E[~js]  )  prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ] < 0; (17)
B(; s) = (E[~js]  )  prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ] > 0;
so that (14) implies the limited liability constraint does not bind in state (; s). Furthermore,
if the limited liability constraint is slack in state (; s), the transfers to protection buyers
after a bad signal are
B(; s) = (E[~js]  ) + A [(s) + (1  (s))P ] < 0 (18)
B(; s) = (E[~js]  ) + A [(s) + (1  (s))P ] > 0:
Otherwise, the transfers after a bad signal are
B(; s) = (s)A  (1  (s))A(1  )R  P

(19)
B(; s) = (s)A+ (1  (s))AR > 0:
In the optimal contract, if the limited liability constraint is slack in state (; s), then
there is full risk sharing given the signal. That is, for a given signal s, the consumption
of the protection buyer is the same irrespective of whether  or  realizes. On the other
hand, in contrast with the rst best, transfers vary with the signal. This is because, after
a bad signal, it is di¢ cult to provide incentives to the agent. Thus, incentive compatibility
reduces the transfers that can be requested from the protection seller. Correspondingly, due
to incentive problems, the protection buyer is exposed to signal risk, as her consumption
is larger after a good signal than after a bad signal. Crosssubsidization across signals
mitigates that e¤ect, but only imperfectly, due to incentive constraints. Crosssubsidization
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across realizations of the signal is possible because the parties commit to the contract at time
0, before advance information is observed. If the contract was written after that information
had been observed, such crosssubsidization would be not be possible. This would reduce
the scope for insurance, in the line with the Hirshleifer (1971) e¤ect.
To further analyze these e¤ects consider the structure of the transfers in Proposition (5).
Each of the transfers in (17) has two components. The rst one is the transfer implementing
full risksharing conditional on a good signal. The second one reects crosssubsidization
across signals. Transfers in (18) have the same structure except that the rst component
now reects full risksharing conditional on a bad signal.
The expectation of the rst component of these transfers, taken over signals and nal
realizations of  is 0. This is what would arise with actuarially fair insurance. But the
insurance o¤ered by the protection seller is not actuarially fair. It involves a premium, to
compensate the protection seller for the e¢ ciency loss induced by margins: prob[s](s)(R 
C   1). This premium is equal to the expectation of the second component of the transfers
in (17) and (18).
The structure of the transfers in (19) is di¤erent. When limited liability binds in state
(; s), full risksharing conditional on the signal is no longer possible, as protection sellers
resources in state (; s) are insu¢ cient. Conditional on a bad signal, the transfers in (19)
implement whatever risksharing is still possible given the binding limited liability constraint.
Now, turn to the determination of the optimal margin call after a bad signal. We rst
note that putting all the assets of the protection seler in the margin account cannot be
optimal.
Proposition 6
(s) < 1: (20)
The logic underlying Proposition 6 is the following. When assets are put in the margin
account, they earn lower return than under the management of the protection seller exerting
e¤ort. This reduces the resources available to pay insurance to the protection buyer. To
cope with this dearth of resources, when (s) = 1 all the assets in the margin account
must be transferred to the protection buyer when  realizes. In this case, as can be seen
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by inspecting (19) for (s) = 1, the structure of transfers is highly constrained. In fact, it
is so constrained that very little risk sharing can be achieved. Hence, a contract requesting
(s) = 1 is suboptimal.
To analyze the precise amount of margin the calls, it is useful to consider the ratio of the
marginal utility of a protection buyer after a bad and a good signal. Denoting this ratio by
', we have
' =
u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
(21)
In the rst-best, there is full insurance and ' is equal to 1. With moral hazard, the protection
buyer is exposed to signal risk. This makes insurance imperfect and drives ' above one.
Given the transfers in Proposition 5, ' is a known function of exogenous variables and
(s). (17) implies that B(; s) is decreasing in (s). Hence the denominator of  is increasing
in (s). On the other hand, the numerator of is decreasing in (s) (irrespective of whether
the limited liability condition in state (; s) binds or not). Hence, ' is decreasing in (s).
Higher margins reduce ', as they reduce the wedge between consumption after a good signal
and after a bad one, i.e., they improve insurance against signal risk. Optimal margins tradeo¤
this benet with their cost: assets in the margin account are less protable than under the
management of the protection seller exerting e¤ort. This tradeo¤ gives rise to the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 If P > 1, margins are not used. Otherwise, we have the following: If
' (0) < 1 + R C 1
1 P , then it is optimal not to use margins. Otherwise, there are two cases. If
'(1  
A (R  P)) < 1 +
R  C   1
1  P ; (22)
the limited liability constraint is slack in state (; s) and the optimal margin solves
'((s)) = 1 +
R  C   1
1  P ; (23)
while, if (22) does not hold, the optimal margin solves
'((s)) = 1 +
R  C   1
1  P +
1  
1  P
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
: (24)
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The right-hand side of (23) reects the tradeo¤between the costs and benets of margins.
The numerator, R C 1, is the opportunity cost of depositing a margin. The denominator
goes up as P decreases, i.e., as the incentive problem gets more severe.
When margins are as in (23), consistency requires that there be enough resources to
provide full insurance conditional on the signal. This is the case if (22) holds. Consistent
with intuition, this is the case if R is large enough. When there is full risk sharing conditional
on the signal, the last term on the right handside of (24) is 0. In that case, (24) simplies
to (23). This case is illustrated in Figure 3. The gure is useful to examine graphically
the e¤ect an increase in p, reducing pledgeable income P. The decrease in P shifts curve '
upwards while shifting 1 + R C 1
1 P downwards. This raises the optimal margin in (23). When
incentive problems become more severe, margins are needed more, to relax the incentive
constraint.
Insert Figure 3 here
On the other hand, when the limited liability constraint binds in state (; s), full risk
sharing conditional on the signal is not achievable, so that u0(+ B(; s)) > u0(+ B(; s)).
The last term on the right handside of (24) is strictly positive, and, correspondingly, margins
are lower than when the limited liability condition is slack. Again, this is because (taking
as given that there is e¤ort) margins reduce the amount of resources eventually available
to pay insurance. When limited liability binds, these resources are sorely needed. So it is
perferable to reduce margins, in order to increase the amount of resources available. The
following corollary gives a su¢ cient condition for (22) to hold.
Corollary 2 A su¢ cient condition for the limited liability condition to be slack in state
(; s) is
1  
A (R  P) >
(1  )R  P
 + (1  )R  P : (25)
Condition (25) holds if  is not too large. In that case, full risksharing after a bad
signal does not request too large resources, and can thus be implemented.
In the rst-best the transfers depend only on the realization of  and the optimal contract
can be implemented with a simple forward contract. In contrast, with moral-hazard and risk-
management e¤ort after both signals, the transfers depend on the realizations of  and s.
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The optimal contract can be implemented by the sale of a forward contract on the underlying
asset  by protection buyers (as in the rst-best) together with the purchase of a forward
contract on the signal s. The forward contract on s generates a gain for protection sellers
in state s. This gain increases their pledgeable income after a bad signal and thus restores
incentive compatibility in the light of the liability from the forward contract on .13
3.2 No e¤ort after a bad signal (risk-taking)
Incentive compatibility after a bad signal reduces risksharing. Protection buyers may nd
this reduction in insurance too costly. They may instead choose to accept shirking on risk
prevention e¤ort (risk-taking) by protection sellers in exchange for a better sharing of the risk
associated with ~. In this subsection, we characterize the optimal contract with risk-taking
after a bad signal.
After a good signal, protection sellers exert risk-management e¤ort so that ~Rj = R for
all j. After a bad signal, protection sellers do not not exert risk-management e¤ort so that
~Rj = R for a proportion p of sellers and ~Rj = 0 for a proportion 1  p of sellers. Hence, the
transfer S from the CCP to a protection seller must now be contingent on the realization
of ~Rj. By contrast, the transfer B from the CCP to a protection buyer does not have to be
contingent on the realization of a particular ~Rj. The CCP can mutualize counterparty risk
and provide insurance to risk-averse protection buyers. However, the aggregate amount of
resources protection sellers generate di¤ers after a good signal and after a bad signal. After
a bad signal, only proportion p of protection sellers generate return R while proportion 1 p
of sellers generate a zero return and cannot make any payments to the CCP as they are
protected by limited liability.
The CCP chooses transfers to buyers and sellers, B(~; ~s; ~R) and S(~; ~s; ~R), to maximize
buyersutility
u( + B(; s; R)) + (1  )(1  )u( + B(; s; R)) (26)
+ (1  )u( + B(; s; pR)) + (1  )u( + B(; s; pR))
13While this implementation is plausible, it is not unique. Other nancial contracts with gains for protec-
tion sellers after s such as options can be used.
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where, after a bad signal, B is written as a function of pR to indicate mutualization of
counterparty risk by the CCP.
The feasibility constraints of the CCP after good and a bad signal, respectively, are given
by
B(; s)   S (; s; R) 8(; s) (27)
B(; s)   pS (; s; R)  (1  p)S (; s; 0) 8(; s) (28)
The limited liability constraints for sellers whose assets generate R and for those whose
assets generate 0, respectively, are given by:
 S(; s; R)  (s)A+ (1  (s))AR for Rj = R (29)
 S(; s; 0)  (s)A for Rj = 0 (30)
The sellers incentive constraint after a good signal is, as before,
 (s)A+ (1   (s))AP   E[S(; s; R)]; (31)
whereas after a bad signal, the seller must prefer not to exert e¤ort
E[S(; s; R)] +  (s)A+ (1   (s))A (R  C) 
pE[S(; s; R)] + (1  p)E[S(; s; 0)] +  (s)A+ (1   (s))pAR;
or, equivalently,
(1   (s))AP   E[S(; s; R)] + E[S(; s; 0)]: (32)
Finally, the sellers participation constraint with risk-taking is
prob[s] (s)A (R  C   1) + prob[s] (s)A(pR  1) + prob[s](1  p)AP (33)
 prob[s]E[S(; s; R)] + prob[s](pE[S(; s; R)] + (1  p)E[S(; s; 0)])
The expected transfer from the CCP to a protection seller (right-hand side) is positive. If a
seller enters the position, she must be compensated for the potential e¢ ciency loss (left-hand
side). The loss is due to two factors: 1) costly margins after good and a bad signal (where
R   C   1 is the opportunity cost of margins when a seller exerts e¤ort and pR   1 is the
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opportunity cost of margins when she does not) and 2) the loss of pledgeable income in the
event of default, which occurs with probability prob[s](1   p). Thus, the contract with no
e¤ort after a bad signal is actuarially unfair. The higher the pledgeable income, the greater
the e¢ ciency loss generated by risk-taking after a bad signal, the more actuarially unfair the
contract.
We can re-write the sellers participation constraint with risk-taking as
Aprob[s] (s) (R  C   1) + Aprob[s] [R  C   ( (s) + (1   (s))pR)] (34)
 prob[s]E[S(; s; R)] + prob[s](pE[S(; s; R)] + (1  p)E[S(; s; 0)])
On the left-hand side, there is again the e¢ ciency loss from entering the contract with
risk-taking. After a good signal, the seller exerts e¤ort but there is an opportunity cost
of margins, given by R   C   1. After a bad signal, the seller does not exert e¤ort and
the e¢ ciency loss is given by the di¤erence between R   C, the return on assets when not
entering the contract and doing e¤ort, and  (s) + (1   (s))pR, the expected return under
the contract with risk-taking.
We rst show that in the optimal contract with risk-taking, the feasibility constraints and
the participation constraint must bind, i.e., protection sellers earn no rents and all resources
available for insurance are passed on to protection buyers.
Proposition 8 In the optimal contract with risk-taking after a bad signal, the feasibility
constraints bind for all (; s) and the participation constraint binds.
The next proposition characterizes the use of margins in the contract with risk-taking and
narrows down the parameter space for which risk-taking after a bad signal can be optimal:
Proposition 9 In the optimal contract with risk-taking after a bad signal, margins are not
used after signal s if the incentive constraint given s is slack or if the moral-hazard is not
severe, i.e., P  1. After signal s, margins are not used if pR  1. If pR < 1, then
(s) = 1. Such contract is, however, dominated by the one with e¤ort after a bad signal.
Without e¤ort after a bad signal, the expected per-unit return on the sellers balance sheet
is pR. If pR < 1, this is lower than what assets return on the margin account. Hence, it is
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more protable to deposit all of the protection sellers assets in the margin account,  = 1,
where they earn a greater return and are ring-fenced from moral hazard. But protection
buyers can do at least as well by requesting e¤ort after a bad signal since, there too,  = 1
can be selected (but, as we know from Proposition 6, it is never optimal). It follows that the
contract with margins and no e¤ort after a bad signal can only be strictly optimal if pR  1.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal transfers in the contract with risk-taking
after a bad signal.
Proposition 10 If pR < 1, then risktaking is suboptimal. Otherwise, the optimal contract
with risk-taking after a bad signal provides full insurance to protection buyers if and only if
pAR     (1  p) prob[s]AP : (35)
The transfers are given by
B(; s) = B(; s) =  (1  )   prob[s](1  p)AP < 0;
B(; s) = B(; s) =    prob[s](1  p)AP > 0:
In contrast to the contract with e¤ort after a bad signal, the contract with risk-taking
does not react to the signal, i.e., B(~; s) = B(~; s). The consumption of the buyer is
equalized across states (i.e., there is full insurance, as in the rst-best) as long as the amount
of resources generated under risk-taking (by the protection sellers who succeed), equal to
pAR, is su¢ ciently high. However, since protection buyers must compensate protection
sellers for the e¢ ciency loss due to risk-taking (given by the loss of pledgeable income in
the event of default after a bad signal, prob[s](1   p)AP), the consumption of protection
buyers falls short of the rst-best consumption levels. Condition (35) ensures that the limited
liability constraints are slack under full insurance. On the left-hand side are the aggregate
resources generated by protection sellers. On the righthand side is the transfer that would
be paid in the rst-best, minus the payment requested by protectionsellers to o¤set the
e¢ ciency loss they incur due to risktaking.
Risktaking can be optimal only if it is not too ine¢ cient, i.e., if pR  1. In that
case, margins are not used. Since protection sellers engage in risktaking after a bad signal,
margins do not help with incentives. Margins are also not needed to insure buyers against
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counterparty risk since it is mutualized by the CCP. Thus, mutualization tackles expost
counterparty risk in the contract with risk-taking, while margins tackle exante incentives
in the contract with e¤ort.
Condition (35) can be re-written as
A [(1  prob[s]) pR + prob[s] (R  C)]  :
Since R   C > 1 and pR  1 (the latter condition is necessary for the contract with risk-
taking to be optimal), it follows that
A [(1  prob[s]) pR + prob[s] (R  C)] > A:
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for (35) to hold is
A  : (36)
In the optimal contract with risk-taking after bad news, thanks to the mutualization
of counterparty risk by the CCP, transfers are not contingent on signals or on individual
protection sellers returns. Hence the optimal contract can be implemented with a single
forward contract (as in the rst-best) provided it is insured by the CCP (unlike in the rst
best). The forward contract, however, is sold at a discount relative to the expected value of
the underlying risk, in order to compensate the protection sellers for the loss of pledgeable
income in default.
3.3 Risk-sharing and risk-taking
The contract under which protection sellers exert e¤ort after both signals entails limited risk-
sharing for buyers but entails no risk-taking by sellers (Subsection 3.1), while the contract
with no e¤ort after a bad signal entails full risk-sharing for protection buyers but is actuarially
unfair and falls short of the rst-best due to the loss of resources in default (Subsection 3.2).
The next proposition characterizes the optimal choice between the two contracts as a function
of the probability of success under risk-taking, p.
Proposition 11 Assume (36) holds. There exists a threshold value of the success probability
under no e¤ort p^ such that riskprevention e¤ort after bad news is optimal if and only if
p  p^.
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The logic of the proposition is illustrated in Figure 4. Consider the expected utility of the
protection buyer when e¤ort is requested after bad news. It decreases when p increases. For
this contract, indeed, the only e¤ect of an increase in p is to tighten the incentive constraint,
and thus reduce risksharing. Now turn to the expected utility of the protection buyer when
e¤ort is not requested after bad news. In contrast with the previous case, it increases when
p increases. Indeed, for this contract, the only e¤ect of an increase in p is to increase the
amount of resources available after bad news. Hence the result, stated in the proposition,
that riskprevention e¤ort after bad news is optimal if and only if p is lower than a threshold.
Insert Figure 4 here
4 Extensions and Robustness
4.1 Renegotiation
The optimal contract inducing e¤ort after both good and bad news is contingent on the signal
s. One may wonder whether the optimal outcome could also be achieved by renegotiating -
at time 1 after s is observed - an initial contract, B(), independent of the signal.
For brevity and simplicity, rather than o¤ering a general treatment of this question, we
discuss the underlying economic forces in the context of an example. Suppose we start
from an initial contracttual transfer B() independent of the signal. For example, suppose
we take it to be the transfer prevailing in the optimal contingent contract after good news
B(; s). Would both parties (protection buyer and protection seller) agree to switch from
B() = B(; s) to B(; s) after observing bad news?
First consider the protection seller. Sticking to B(; s) after a bad signal violates her
incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, she does not exert risk-management e¤ort and fails
with probability 1  p. Her expected gain is then:14
p
 
AR  B(; s)+ (1  )p  AR  B(; s) : (37)
If instead she switches to B(; s), and thus exerts risk-management e¤ort, she expects to
obtain
14Recall that with probability 1  p, ~Rj = 0 and that B(; ~s; 0) = 0.
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
 
AR  B(; s)+ (1  )  AR  B(; s)  AC: (38)
By switching, the protection seller increases the expected payo¤ on her assets. She also
reduces the payment to the protection buyers as B(; s) < B(; s). Thus, switching is
quite attractive for her, as we now establish more formally. Substituting for the transfers
and re-arranging, (38) is larger than (37) if and only if
AP < E[]  prob[s]E[~js] (39)
which is satised under our assumption that (11) does not hold.
Now turn to protection buyers. Sticking to B(; s) after a bad signal implies higher
transfers from the CCP, but undermines the incentives of the protection seller. When the
CCP insures against counterparty risk, the protection buyer does not internalize the cost of
default of his counterparty. Consequently, the protection buyer does not accept to switch
from the initial contract to B(; s) after bad news. Thus, the simple renegotiation game we
proposed does not implement the optimal contract. This negative result extends to a larger
class of renegotiation games. To the extent that they are insured against counterparty risk,
investors are not willing to downscale initially generous insurance promises to preserve incen-
tives. This suggests that, with centralized clearing, the adjustment of transfers, contingent
on the arrival of information, should be factored in the initial contract.
What if, instead, trading occurs bilaterally over-the-counter and there is no centralized
clearing? Then, in the simple renegotiation game proposed above, after observing bad news
the protection buyer knows he will be exposed to counterparty risk if he sticks to B(; s).
In this case his expected utility is
u( + B(; s)) + (1  )pu( + B(; s)): (40)
If instead he switches to B(; s), the protection buyers expected utility is
u( + B(; s)) + (1  )u( + B(; s)): (41)
Substituting for the transfers, (41) is larger than (40) if and only if
p <
u(E(js)+AP)
u(E(js)  prob [s]prob [s]AP)
  
1   : (42)
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If (42) holds, i.e., if e¤ort strongly improves productive e¢ ciency, then although they
started from an initial noncontingent contract B(), both parties are happy to switch to
B(; s) after bad news, in order to preserve incentives. This suggests that, with bilateral
trading and noncentralized clearing, initially noncontingent contracts could, in some cases,
be successfully renegotiated to the optimal contract.
On the other hand, if p is relatively large and (42) does not hold, protection buyers dont
nd it very attractive to renegotiate to lower insurance payments after bad news. In that
case, renegotiation is unlikely to implement the optimal contract.
4.2 Derivatives payo¤s
The payo¤ from an interest rate swap is symmetric, while the payo¤ from a credit-default
swap is highly skewed: most of the time, protection sellers collect a small insurance premium
but in the rare case of default, they have to make large payments to protection buyers. Does
this skewness in the payo¤ have an e¤ect on incentives?
To analyze the e¤ect of an increase in the skewness of the hedged risk on incentives
formally, we increase the probability  of a good outcome for the protection buyers risk 
while keeping its mean and the standard deviation constant.15 An increase of  increases the
amount of risk to be hedged, . Consequently, protection buyers demand more insurance,
which increases the incentive problem for protection sellers. There is, however, a counterveil-
ing e¤ect when the skewness  is already large. In that case, the good outcome of the hedged
risk is quite likely and the information content of a bad signal s is low. Thus, at high levels
of , a further increase of skewness mutes the negative e¤ect of bad news on incentives. But,
as long as  <  (the precision of the signal s), the negative e¤ect on incentives from larger
amounts of risk dominates and more skewness leads to more severe incentive problems. In
this case, it is more di¢ cult to maintain risk-management incentives when the underlying
risk is skewed.
15The mean  and the standard deviation  of ~ are  = +(1  )  and  = p (1  ), respectively.
We can therefore write  and  as a function of  as follows:  = + 
q
1 
 and  =   
q

1  . Holding
the mean and standard deviation constant, an increase in  leads to more skewness (when  > 12 ).
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4.3 Non-linear cost of risk-management e¤ort
Up to now, we assumed the cost of riskmanagement e¤ort increased linearly in the assets
under management. We now relax this assumption and allow the cost of e¤ort to be convex in
assets under management.16 This reects the notion that, while controlling and preventing
risk is relatively easy when the amount of assets under management is low, it gets more
complex and costly when this amount is large.17 Thus, we assume the cost of riskprevention
e¤ort, when assets under management are (1  )A, is equal to
c(1  )A+ (1  )2A2: (43)
In the analysis above we had  = 0.  > 0 gives rise to a new e¤ect: as margins increase,
assets under management decrease, and so does the marginal cost of riskmanagement. We
hereafter analyze the optimal contract arising in this case. Since margins do not play any
role in the contract without risk-management e¤ort after bad news, we need only consider
the contract with e¤ort. As in Section 3.1, the feasibility and participation constraints bind:
there is no reason to have idle resources or to leave rents to protection sellers. Moreover, the
incentive constraint is slack after a good signal,and there is no margin call, while it binds
after a bad signal, in which case there may be a margin call. As in Section 3, the incentive
compatibility condition after bad news simplies to
(s)A+ (1  (s))AP((s))  E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]: (44)
The di¤erence with Section 3 is that now the pledgeable return now depends on the size of
the margin call after a bad signal:
P((s))  R  c+ (1  (s))A
1  p : (45)
Margins improve risk-sharing when they relax the incentive constraint after a bad signal,
i.e., when the lefthandside of (44) is increasing in , i.e.,
P((s))  (1  (s))P 0 < 1: (46)
16Cost convexity is a classical assumption in microeconomics. It leads to well behaved problems, in
contrast with cost concavity for which optimality is more di¢ cult to characterize.
17This is in line with Berk and Green (2004)s assumption that fundsmarginal returns decrease with
assets under management.
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It is easier to satisfy condition (46) when the cost of e¤ort is convex (so that P 0 > 0) than
when it is linear (and P 0 = 0). This reects the above mentioned e¤ect that, as margins
increase, the marginal cost of riskmanagement decreases.
To determine the optimal margin with convex costs, we proceed as in Section 3.1. The
transfers B and S have the same structure as in Proposition 5, except that P is now given
by (45). We obtain the following proposition (where, as before, ' denotes the ratio of the
marginal utility of a protection buyer after a bad and a good signal).
Proposition 12 With a convex cost of risk-management e¤ort,  > 0, an optimal interior
margin after a bad signal (s) is given by
'((s)) = 1 +
R  C   1
1  [P((s))  (1  (s))P 0] : (47)
As in Proposition 7, the optimal interior margin reects the tradeo¤ between improved
risk-sharing across signals and the opportunity cost of margin deposits. But now P 0 > 0,
which lowers the righthandside of the inequality. Holding P xed (to reason other things
equal) this increases the value of (s) (the solution of (47)). Thus, we obtain the following
comparative static result:
Proposition 13 Other things equal, the greater the convexity of the cost of risk prevention,
the larger the optimal margin.
5 Empirical implications
According to our theory, a strong and pledgeable asset base (AP) helps maintaining protection
sellers riskprevention incentives.18 Asset pledgeability decreases with the cost of risk
prevention, the ineciency of risk-management practices,19 and the opacity and complexity
of nancial institutions and their activities. Our model (in particular Propositions 5 and 10)
predicts a non-linear, U-shaped, relation between derivatives exposures and the pledgeability
of assets:
18While for simplicity protection sellers have no initial debt in our model, to gauge this implication
empirically one should consider assets net of liabilities.
19Ellul and Yerramili (2013) propose a Risk Management Index measuring the organizational strength and
independence of the risk management function within nancial insititutions.
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Empirical implication 1. Financial institutions with e¢ cient risk-management and
transparent activities optimally choose large derivatives exposures; nancial institutions with
less e¢ cient risk-management and more opaque activities choose small derivatives exposures;
nancial institutions with very ine¢ cient risk management and opaque activities choose large
exposures (associated with signicant counterparty risk).
Derivatives exposure and protection sellersincentives also depend on the macroeconomic
and nancial environment in which nancial institutions operate. For example, an environ-
ment characterized by a low probability of failure even when there is no risk-management
e¤ort (high p) can be viewed as a benign/low-risk economic situation. Derivatives con-
tracts that o¤er ample insurance but undermine risk-management incentives will be traded
in such a benign environment (see Proposition 11). This resonates with the notion that risk
builds up in goodtimes (see, e.g., Borio, 2011).
In this context, consider the e¤ect of bad news. For example, when the underlying
risk insured is that of mortgage defaluts, declining house prices convey bad news. After
bad news, protection sellers give up on riskprevention. Hence they become more likely to
default. This creates correlation between the mortgage values and the values of nancial
institutionsassets without direct exposure to mortgage default.
An increase in the precision of the public information signal () increases this endogenous
correlation. Information about the performance of mortgage-backed securities and CDS
contracts written on them was unavailable before 2006.20 The ABX.HE indices providing
this information were introduced only in January 2006. As of early 2007, the prices for
the index on AAA securitizations and those on BBB securitizations, which were virtually
identical until then, started to diverge. Our theoretical analysis implies that the information
then conveyed by the ABX.HE undermined the incentives of protection sellers. To the
extent that ample insurance kept being written, it came at the expense of risk-taking. We
summarize this discussion in our next empirical implication:
Empirical implication 2. Derivatives contracts with large exposures are more likely to
be underwritten when the economic environment seems benign. In this context, after bad news
about the hedged risk, the expected value of the other assets of protection sellers decreases.
20Although the issuance of mortgage-backed securites was around $ 2 trillion in every year from 2002 until
2006 (see, e.g., Fender and Scheicher, 2008).
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The more accurate the information about the hedged risk, the stronger this contagion.
The use of margins depends on their opportunity cost and the degree to which they
alleviate protection sellersincentive problem. The opportunity cost of margins depends on
the risk-free rate (normalized to one in our analysis) since this is the rate assets on the
margin account earn. When risk-free rates are low compared to the return on productive
investment opportunities, the opportunity cost of margins increases and the optimal margin
is lower.
Empirical implication 3. When risk-free rates are low compared to the return on
productive investment opportunities, the optimal margin deposit is lower.
In terms of alleviating the incentive problem, margins are particularly benecial when
the cost of risk-management e¤ort is convex, and the optimal margin is higher the more
convex risk-management costs are (see Proposition 13). Convexity in risk-management costs
implies that the risk of each additional unit of assets is more costly to manage. This could
be a feature of complex and opaque (information-sensitive) assets which require intense
monitoring and information collection, which becomes more expensive as the size of assets
under management increases. Convexity in risk-management cost could also be related to
liquidity of assets under management, with larger positions being more illiquid (e.g., due to
a larger price impact and higher execution costs in case the position needs to be closed).
The above discussion is summarized in our next implication:
Empirical implication 4. The more risk-management costs increase with assets under
management, the higher the optimal margin.
6 Policy implications
6.1 Margins and equity capital
We showed that margins allow for more incentive-compatible insurance as they ring-fence
assets from protection seller moral-hazard. Would capital requirements o¤er alternative
mechanisms to reduce moral-hazard? What are the similarities and the di¤erences between
margins and equity capital in the context of our analysis? These questions are particularly
relevant since the regulatory overhaul in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 nancial crisis
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includes both margins and capital requirements. As argued below, our theoretical analysis
implies margins can be an attractive substitute to capital.
Margins reduce the need for equity capital: In our model, at t = 0, protection
sellers have assets A and no liabilities. Hence, the book value of their equity capital (the
di¤erence between assets and liabilities) is A. Its market value, reecting rationally antic-
ipated future cash ows, is AR. At t = 1, after a good signal, the derivative position is
an expected asset for a protection seller, and the value of her equity increases. After a bad
signal, however, the derivative position is an expected liability for a protection seller. The
optimal contract with e¤ort limits this liability to
A[(s) + (1  (s))P)]; (48)
to preserve protection sellers incentives to exert risk-management e¤ort (see (15)). Thus,
the value of a protection sellers equity capital after a bad signal at t = 1 is
(1  (s)) (R  P)A > 0; (49)
which is the di¤erence between the value of protection sellers assets, A [(s) + (1  (s))R],
and the value of her liability, (48). The interpretation is that the optimal contract with
e¤ort requires protection sellers to hold a minimum amount of equity (i.e., keep enough skin
in the game) to make sure the incentive compatibility constraint holds.
Without margin calls (e.g., if there was no enforcement mechanism for margins), the
incentive compatibility condition would be more demanding. Hence protection sellers would
need to have a higher amount of equity (more skin in the game) to ensure that e¤ort remains
incentive compatible. In that sense, margins are a substitute to equity capital. Margins
improve incentives by making the asset side of the balance sheet less susceptible to moral-
hazard. With less moral-hazard, the assets can support larger liabilities. Consequently,
margins allow protection sellers to engage in incentive-compatible derivative trading with
less equity.
Higher capital is an alternative to margins, but can be infeasible. Another way
to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint after a bad signal would be to increase the
protection sellers initial equity capital. This could be di¢ cult to implement, however. In our
simple agency-theoretic framework, raising capital from dispersed outside investors doesnt
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improve the incentives of the manager. Quite to the contrary, it dilutes her ownership of the
rm and reduces her incentives to exert e¤ort. Thus, increasing capital relaxes incentive-
compatibility only if the additional capital belongs to the agent (increasing her skin in the
game) or to investors closely monitoring the agent (which reduces the severity of the moral
hazard problem.) When these conditions cannot be met, margin requirements are more
e¤ective than capital requirements.
Moreover, margins, unlike equity, are linked to derivative positions. A margin call only
occurs when the derivative position turns into a liability (which depends on information
about the underlying asset). Capital requirements, independent of the development of deriv-
ative positions, could be wasteful, as they would require equity capital even when derivative
positions are protable.
6.2 CCP design
The key advantage of the CCP over bilateral contracting is the mutualization of counterparty
default risk. By insuring protection buyers, it makes them more eager to contract with
protection sellers. At the same time, it makes each of them less eager to take costly action
to reduce protection sellersdefault risk. Margin calls, in our analysis, are one of the key
instruments to reduce that risk. Thus, to implement the optimal contract characterized
in this paper, one cannot delegate to the trading parties the task of designing their own
individual margin calls. Such decentralization would lead to insu¢ cient margining and
excessive counterparty default. To see this, consider the case where the optimal contract
calls for high e¤ort even after bad news. Suppose the CCP o¤ers the optimal transfers
S(; s) and B(; s) described above, while letting each protectionseller/protectionbuyer
pair choose their own margin call. A limitedliability protection seller and a protection buyer
insured by the CCP against counterparty risk, both prefer to set (s) = 0; 8s. This implies
the incentive-compatibility condition of the protection seller does not hold, and results in
excessive counterparty default risk. This is a form of free-riding, since the cost of that default
is borne by all the other members of the CCP. To avoid such free-riding, margin calls must
be mandated by the CCP.
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7 Conclusion
We analyze optimal contracts in the context of hedging with derivatives. We show how
contracts designed to engineer risk-sharing can generate incentives for risk-taking. When
the position of the protection seller becomes a liability for her, it undermines her incentives
to exert risk prevention e¤ort. The failure to exert such e¤ort may lead to the default of the
protection seller. Thus, a bad signal about derivative positions can propagate to other lines
of business of nancial institutions and, when doing so, create endogenous counterparty risk.
When the sellers moral hazard is moderate, margins enhance the scope for risk-sharing.
Our emphasis on the positive consequence of margins contrasts with the result that margins
can be destabilizing, as shown by Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). The contrast stems from di¤erences in assumptions. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) take margin constraints as given and, for these margins,
derive equilibrium prices. Greater margins force intermediaries to sell more after bad shocks,
which pushes prices down and can generate spirals. In contrast, we endogenize margins, but
take as given the value of assets a protection seller deposits on a margin account. It would
be interesting in future research to combine the two approaches and study how endogenous
margins could destabilize equilibrium prices. This would be in the line of Acharya and
Viswanathan (2011)s analysis of the equilibrium price at which borrowers liquidate assets
and the corresponding re-sales negative externality.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Form the Lagrangian using the objective (6), the feasibility
constraints (3) with multiplier FC and the participation constraint (7) with multiplier . For
the moment we ignore the limited liability constraints (4) in the rst-best. We then show
that rst-best transfers do not violate limited liability given our assumption AR > .
Since ~R = R under e¤ort, we do not explicitly write the dependence of the transfers on ~R.
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to B(; s) and S(; s) are,
respectively,
prob[; s]u0( + B(; s))  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s) (50)
prob[; s]  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s): (51)
Since marginal utility is strictly positive, it follows from (50) that FC (; s) > 0 for all
(; s) and hence the feasibility constraints bind. Since FC (; s) > 0, it follows from (51)
that the participation constraint binds. After substituting (50) into (51), it follows that
buyersmarginal utility is the same across all states. That is, there is full risk-sharing.
From equal marginal utility across all states, we obtain, rst, that  + B(; s) =  +
B(; s) and hence B(; s) = B(; s) for  = ; . Second, we obtain that  + B(; s) =
 + B(; s) and hence B(; s)  B(; s) =  for s = s; s.
Using S(; s) =  B(; s) (from the binding feasibility constraints) and B(; s) =
B(; s), we can write the binding participation constraint as
 (prob[; s] + prob[; s])B(; s)  (prob[; s] + prob[; s])B(; s) = 0 (52)
Using B(; s) B(; s) =  to substitute for B(; s) and since prob[; s]+prob[; s] =
prob[] =  (and similarly for 1  ), the binding participation constraint yields B(; s) =
, from which the remaining transfers in the proposition follow immediately. QED
Proof of Lemma 1 Plugging the rst-best transfers from Proposition 1 into the in-
centive conditions (10) and using (~s) = 0 yields AP  (   ) and AP  (   ).
When the signal is informative,  > 1
2
, we have  >  > . The result in the lemma follows.
QED
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Proof of Proposition 2 Form the Lagrangian using the objective (6), the feasibility
constraints (3) with multiplier FC (; s), the limited liability constraints (4) with multipliers
LL (; s), the feasibility constraints on margins (5) with 0 (s) for  (s)  0 and 1 (s)
for  (s)  1, the incentive compatibility constraints (10) with multipliers IC(s) and the
participation constraint (12) with multiplier .
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to B(; s) and S(; s) are
prob[; s]u0( + B(; s))  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s) (53)
prob[; s] + LL(; s) + prob[js]IC(s)  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s): (54)
Since marginal utilities are positive, it follows from (53) that FC (; s) > 0 and hence
all feasibility constraints bind:
B(; s) =  S(; s);8(; s): (55)
Using (53) to substitute for FC (; s) in (54) and rearranging, we obtain
u0( + B(; s)) = +
LL(; s)
prob[; s]
+
IC(s)
prob[s]
8(; s) (56)
where we used that prob[js]prob[s] = prob[; s].
We next show that the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack for each s. The
proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the limited liability constraints cannot
bind for both the state (; s) and the state (; s). Suppose not. Since both limited liability
constraints after the signal s bind, we have S(; s) = (s)A+(1 (s))AR and S(; s) =
(s)A+ (1  (s))AR. Hence,
E[ S(~; ~s)j~s = s] = (s)A+ (1  (s))AR 8s
But since R > P, this violates the incentive compatibility constraint (10) after the signal s.
Hence, at least one limited liability constraint after the signal s must be slack.
Second, we show that the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is always slack for
each s. Suppose not, so that  S(; s) = (s)A+(1 (s))AR. We have just shown that at
least one limited liability constraint after the signal s must be slack. Hence, we must have
that  S(; s) < (s)A + (1   (s))AR and LL(; s) = 0. Using the binding feasibility
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constraints (55), we therefore have B(; s) > B(; s) 8s, which implies u0(+ B(; s)) <
u0( + B(; s)); 8s, since  > . However, using LL(; s) = 0 in (56) implies u0( +
B(; s))  u0( + B(; s)); 8s. A contradiction. Hence, the limited liability constraint is
slack in state (; s) and LL(; s) = 0 for all s.
Finally, we show by contradiction that the participation constraint (12) binds. Suppose
not. Plugging  = 0 and LL(; s) = 0 (just shown above) into (56) implies that IC(s) > 0
for all s. Hence, both incentive constraints bind,  E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] = (s)A+(1 (s))AP
for s = s; s. Therefore,
E[S(~; ~s)] = E[E[S(~; ~s)j~s]] =  E[(~s)A+ (1  (~s))AP ] (57)
From the participation constraint, we have
0  E[S(~; ~s)]  E[(~s)]A(R  C   1)
=  E[(~s)A+ (1  (~s))AP ]  E[(~s)]A(R  C   1) [using (57)]
=  E[(1  (~s))AP + (~s)A(R  C)]:
The last expression is strictly negative since R   C > P > 0 and 0  (~s)  1. A
contradiction. Hence, the participation constraint binds and also  > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian from the proof of Proposition 2 with respect
to (s) are
0 (s)  1 (s)
A
+ IC(s)(1  P) = prob[s] (R  C   1) + (R  1)LL(; s) 8s; (58)
where we have used LL(; s) = 0 for all s (Proposition 2).
The right-hand side of (58) is strictly positive since R C > 1 and  > 0 (see the end of
the proof of Proposition 2). If the incentive constraint is slack for a signal s, then s = 0,
implying that 0 (s) > 0 must hold and (s) = 0. Similarly, if P  1, then 0 (s) > 0 for
each s must hold and (s) = 0 for all s. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
It cannot be that both incentive constraints are slack since we assume that the rst-best
is not attainable, AP < (   ). It also cannot be that both incentive constraints bind
(see the argument that the participation constraint binds in the proof of Proposition 2).
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We now show by contradiction that the incentive constraint following a bad signal binds.
Suppose not and hence IC (s) = 0. After the good signal, the limited liability constraints
are slack, LL(; s) = 0 by Proposition 2 and LL(; s) = 0 since we are considering a relaxed
problem - see condition (14)). Equations (56) for s = s then imply that u0( + B(; s)) =
u0(+ B(; s)). There is full risk-sharing conditional on the good signal. For transfers after
a good signal we thus have
B(; s)  B(; s) =  > 0 (59)
After the bad signal, limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack, LL(; s) = 0
by Proposition 2. In state (; s), we have two cases to consider, depending on whether the
limited liability constraint is slack or whether it binds.
Consider rst the case when the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack, LL(; s) =
0. Equations (56) for s = s then imply that there is also full risk-sharing conditional on the
bad signal, u0( + B(; s)) = u0( + B(; s)); and thus
B(; s)  B(; s) =  > 0 (60)
Since IC (s) = 0 and LL(; s) = LL(; s) = 0, it follows from equations in (56) that
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s)); and thus
B(; s)  B(; s): (61)
From the binding participation constraint
prob[s]E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] + prob[s]E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] = E[(~s)]A(R  C   1)  0
and E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] < 0 (binding incentive constraint after a good signal), we know that
E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] > 0 (62)
Using full risk-sharing conditional on the signal (equations (59) and (60)) we can write
E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] = S(; s) + (1  ) S(; s)
= S(; s) + 

S(; s)  S(; s)
= S(; s) + 

S(; s)  S(; s)
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Using (61) and the binding feasibility conditions (55), we have S(; s)  S(; s). And since
 <  (the signal is informative), we have
E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s]  S(; s) +  S(; s)  S(; s)
< S(; s) + 

S(; s)  S(; s)
and thus E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] < E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s]. But since E[S(~; ~s)js] < 0 (by the binding
incentive constraint after a good signal), we have a contradiction with (62).
Now, consider the case when the limited liability constraint in state (; s) binds. Since
LL(; s) = 0 (by Proposition 2) and IC(s) = 0, equations (56) for s = s imply that
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s)); and thus
B(; s)  B(; s)  : (63)
Since (s) = 0 (incentive constraint after a bad signal is slack in contradiction), the
binding limited liability constraint is AR =  S(; s). Together with (63) in conjunction
with the binding feasibility constraints (55), we then have
 E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] =   S(; s) + (1  ) S(; s)
=  S(; s)   S(; s)  S(; s)
 AR  
Since  <  (informative signal) and AR >  (limited liability constraints are slack in
the rst-best), we have  E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s] > (   ). But since the incentive constraint
after a bad signal is slack, AP >  E[S(~; ~s)j~s = s], this would mean that AP > (  )
and the rst-best can be reached, which is a contradiction.
Consequently, the incentive constraint after a bad signal binds and the incentive con-
straint after a good signal must be slack. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
After a good signal, we have full risk-sharing (see the derivation of equation (59) in the
proof of Proposition 4). Using (59) and (16), we obtain the transfers B(; s) and B(; s).
After a bad signal, we have to distinguish two cases, depending on whether the limited
liability constraint in state (; s) is slack or not. If it is slack, then we have full risk-sharing
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(see the derivation of equation (60) in the proof of Proposition 4). Using (60) and (15), we
obtain the transfers B(; s) and B(; s). If the limited liability constraint binds, we have
(s)A+ (1  (s))AR =  S(; s), which we plug into (15) to obtain B(; s).
Finally, we check that, under (14), the limited liability constraint in (; s) is slack. Since
(s) = 0, the limited liability constraint (4) writes as B(; s) < AR. Now, Proposition 5
implies that B(; s) decreases in (s). So B(; s) < AR for all (s) if and only if it is for
(s) = 0. After simplications, B(; s) < AR for (s) = 0 is equivalent to (14).
QED
Proof of Proposition 6
We claim that (s) < 1. Suppose not and (s) = 1. First, note that LL(; s) > 0 must
hold in this case. Suppose not, and LL(; s) = 0. Then, equations (56) for s = s imply that
that there is full risk-sharing conditional on the bad signal. Hence, the individual transfers
after the bad signal are given by (18) so that B(; s) =  S(; s) = +A > A. But the
limited liability constraint requires  S(; s)  A, a contradiction. Since LL(; s) > 0, the
limited liability constraint binds and the individual transfers after a bad signal are as in (19).
In particular, B(; s) = A > 0. Equations (56) and binding incentive constraint after a bad
signal imply that B(; s)  B(; s) = A > 0. However, by equation (17), B(; s) < 0. A
contradiction.
QED
Proof of Proposition 7
Since the incentive constraint after a good signal is slack (see Proposition 4), it follows
from Proposition 3 that (s) = 0. It remains to characterize the optimal margin after a
bad signal.
We now derive the optimal margin after a bad signal, (s). Using equations (56) to
subsitute for , IC (s) and LL(; s) in equation (58), we get
u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
= 1 +
R  C   1
1  P +
1 (s)  0 (s)
u0( + B(; s))prob[s] (1  P)A (64)
+
1  
1  P
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
where we used IC (s) = 0 (Proposition 4).
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Denote the RHS of (64) by '. Note that @
B(;s)
@
=  prob[s]prob[s]A (R  C   P) < 0. For P < 1,
@B(;s)
@
> 0. (When the limited liability constraint is slack, we have @
B(;s)
@
= A (1  P) > 0
and when the limited liability constraint binds, we have @
B(;s)
@
= A
h
1 + (1 )R P

i
> 0
since R  P > R  1 > (R  1)). Hence, ' is decreasing in . If ' (0) < 1 + R C 1
1 P , then
' (0) < 1 +
R  C   1
1  P +
1  
1  P
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
for any  2 [0; 1] (since the last term is non-negative). By equation (64) we have 0 > 0 and
hence (s) = 0.
Otherwise, there are two cases depending on whether or not the limited liability constraint
in state (; s) is slack. If it is slack, then marginal utilities after the bad signal are equalized
(equation (60)), and the last term in equation (64) vanishes. The optimal margin (s) 2
(0; 1) is given by ' ((s)) = 1 + R C 1
1 P in this case. If the limited liability constraint binds,
then the optimal margin (s) 2 (0; 1) solves
u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
  1  
1  P
u0( + B(; s))  u0( + B(; s))
u0( + B(; s))
= 1 +
R  C   1
1  P
We now check under what conditions the limited liability constraints are slack. By Propo-
sition 2, we only need to check limited liability constraints in states (; s) and (; s). First,
consider the case when P  1 and margins are not used. The limited liability constraints are
slack if and only if: AR >  S(; s; R) = B(; s; R); 8(; s; R): Since B(; s)  B(; s),
we only need to check when the limited liability constraint is slack in state (; s). It is slack
if and only if:
   prob[s]
prob[s]
AP < AR (65)
or, equivalently,
AR   > prob[s]
prob[s]
[(   )    AP ] > 0:
Now consider the case when P < 1. The limited liability constraints in this case are
slack if and only if: (s)A + (1   (s))AR >  S(; s; R); 8(; s; R), with  (s) = 0 and
(s)  0. The limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack if and only if:
   prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ] < AR
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Since R  C > P > 0, we have:
   prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ] <    prob[s]
prob[s]
AP
Hence, condition (65) is su¢ cient for the limited liability constraint to be slack in state (; s).
The limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack if and only if:
(s) < 1  
A (R  P)
Since the optimal interior margin when the limited liability constraint is slack is given by
(s) = ' 1

1 +
R  C   1
1  P

;
the constraint in state (; s) is slack if and only if
' 1

1 +
R  C   1
1  P

< 1  
A (R  P) :
Note that if the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack, it must be that
B(; s) < 0 (equation (18)) implying that
(s) <
(1  )   AP
A (1  P)
must hold if the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack.
In case the limited liability constraint binds, it also must be that B(; s) < 0. This is
because equations (19) imply that
B(; s) = (s)A+ (1  (s))AR >
E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] = (s)A+ (1  (s))AP [since R > P and (s) < 1]
> 0 > B(; s) [since E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] = B(; s) + (1  ) B(; s)]
For B(; s) to be negative if the limited liability constraint in state (; s) binds, it must be
that
(s)

1 +
(1  )R  P


<
(1  )R  P

or, equivalently,
(s) <
(1  )R  P
 + (1  )R  P < 1
47
It follows that a su¢ cient condition for the limited liability constraint in state (; s) to
be slack is
1  
A (R  P) >
(1  )R  P
 + (1  )R  P :
QED
Proof of Proposition 8
Form the Lagrangian using the objective (26), the feasibility constraints (27) and (28)
with multipliers FC (; s), the limited liability constraints (29) and (30) with multipliers
LL (; s; R), the feasibility constraints on margins (5) with 0 (s) for  (s)  0 and 1 (s)
for  (s)  1, the incentive compatibility constraints (31) and (32) with multipliers IC(s)
and the participation constraint (33) with multiplier .
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to B(; s) are
prob[; s]u0( + B(; s))  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s) (66)
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to S(; s; R), S(; s; R) and
S(; s; 0) are
prob[; s] + LL(; s; R) + prob[js]IC(s)  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s; R) (67)
prob[; s] +
LL(; s; R)
p
  prob[js]IC(s)
p
  FC (; s) = 0 8(; s; R) (68)
prob[; s] +
LL(; s; 0)
1  p + prob[js]
IC(s)
1  p   FC (; s) = 0 8(; s; 0) (69)
Since marginal utilities are positive, it follows from (66) that FC (; s) > 0 and hence
the feasibility constraints (27) and (28) bind.
Using (66) to substitute for FC (; s) in (67)-(69) and rearranging, we obtain
u0( + B(; s)) = +
LL(; s; R)
prob[; s]
+
IC(s)
prob[s]
8(; s; R) (70)
u0( + B(; s)) = +
LL(; s; R)
pprob[; s]
  IC(s)
pprob[s]
8(; s; R) (71)
u0( + B(; s)) = +
LL(; s; 0)
(1  p) prob[; s] +
IC(s)
(1  p)prob[s] 8(; s; 0) (72)
where we used that prob[js]prob[s] = prob[; s].
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Combining (71) and (72) yields
(1  p)LL(; s; R)  pLL(; s; 0) = prob[js]IC(s) 8(; s) (73)
We next show that the limited liability constraint in state (; s; R) is slack. The proof
proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the limited liability constraints cannot bind for
both the state (; s; R) and the state (; s; R). Suppose not. Since both limited liability
constraints after the signal s bind, we have  S(; s; R) = (s)A + (1   (s))AR and
 S(; s; R) = (s)A+ (1 (s))AR. Hence, E[ S(; s; R)] = (s)A+ (1 (s))AR. But
since R > P, this violates the incentive compatibility constraint (31) after the good signal.
Hence, at least one limited liability constraint after the signal s must be slack.
Second, we show that the limited liability constraint in state (; s; R) is always slack.
Suppose not, so that  S(; s; R) = (s)A+(1 (s))AR. We have just shown that at least
one limited liability constraint after the signal s must be slack. Hence, we must have that
 S(; s; R) < (s)A + (1   (s))AR and LL(; s; R) = 0. Using the binding feasibility
constraints (27), we have B(; s; R) > B(; s; R), which implies
u0( + B(; s; R)) < u0( + B(; s; R))
since  > . However, using LL(; s; R) = 0 in (70) implies
u0( + B(; s; R))  u0( + B(; s; R)):
A contradiction. Hence, the limited liability constraint is slack in state (; s; R) and LL(; s; R) =
0.
Third, we show by contradiction that  > 0 and the participation constraint (33) binds.
Suppose not, i.e.  = 0. Using  = 0 in (71), it follows that LL(; s; R) > 0 must hold
for  = ; . Using  = 0 and LL(; s; R) = 0 (just shown above) in (70), it follows that
IC(s) > 0 and the incentive constraint in state s binds. Now, there are two possibilities in
state s: either the incentive constraint binds or it is slack.
Consider rst the case when the incentive constraint in state s binds. Using the binding
limited liability constraints in states (; s; R) and (; s; R) in the incentive constraint in state
s, we get
(1   (s))AP = (s)A+ (1  (s))AR + S(; s; 0) + (1  )S(; s; 0)
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or, equivalently,
(s)A+ (1   (s))A (R  P) =  S(; s; 0)  (1  )S(; s; 0) (74)
If the limited liability constraints (30) are slack, we have S(; s; 0) < (s)A and S(; s; 0) <
(s)A so that the right-hand side of (74) is strictly smaller than (s)A. Since (1  (s))A (R  P) 
0, the left-hand side of (74) is greater or equal to (s)A. A contradiction. If the limited
liability constraints (30) are binding, then all limited liability constraints in state s bind.
Using the binding limited liability constraints in state s and the binding incentive constraint
in state s in the (weakly slack) participation constraint (33), we get
prob[s] (s)A (R  C   1) + prob[s] (s)A(pR  1) + prob[s](1  p)AP
  prob[s] ((s)A+ (1  (s))AP)  prob[s](p ((s)A+ (1  (s))AR) + (1  p)(s)A)
Simplifying yields
prob[s] [ (s)A (R  C) + (1  (s))AP ] + prob[s]A [(1  p)P + pR]  0 (75)
Since both terms on the right-hand side of (75) are strictly positive, we have a contradiction.
Now consider the case when the incentive constraint in state s is slack so that IC(s) =
0. Since LL(; s; R) > 0 and LL(; s; R) > 0, using IC(s) = 0 in (73) implies that
LL(
; s; 0) > 0 and LL(; s; 0) > 0 must hold. Hence, all limited liability constraints in
state s bind. But we have just shown in the previous step that this is incompatible with the
weakly slack participation constraint. A contradiction.
We conclude that  > 0 and the participation constraint must bind.
Fourth, we show that LL(; s; R) = 0 and  S(; s; R)  (s)A + (1   (s))AR. The
proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that it cannot be that both LL(; s; R) > 0 and
LL(; s; R) > 0. Suppose not. When both LL(; s; R) > 0 and LL(; s; R) > 0, then
 S(; s; R) =  S(; s; R) = (s)A+ (1  (s))AR (76)
Using (76) in the incentive constraint after a bad signal (32) yields
 E[S(; s; 0)] + (1   (s))AP < (s)A+ (1  (s))AR
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since  E[S(; s; 0)]  (s)A and P < R. Hence, the incentive constraint after a bad signal
is slack and IC(s) = 0. Since LL(; s; R) > 0 and LL(; s; R) > 0, using IC(s) = 0 in
(73) implies that LL(; s; 0) > 0 and LL(; s; 0) > 0 must hold. Hence, all limited liability
constraints in state s bind. Using the binding limited liability constraints in state s in the
binding participation constraint (33), we get
prob[s] (s)A (R  C   1) + prob[s] (s)A(pR  1) + prob[s](1  p)AP
= prob[s]E[S(; s; R)]  prob[s](p ((s)A+ (1  (s))AR) + (1  p)(s)A)
Simplifying yields
prob[s] (s)A (R  C   1) + prob[s]ApR + prob[s](1  p)AP = prob[s]E[S(; s; R)] (77)
For equation (77) to hold, it must be that E[S(; s; R)] > 0. By the binding feasibil-
ity constraint (27), this is equivalent to E[B(; s; R)] < 0. There can be two cases:
either the incentive constraint after a good signal binds or it is slack. First, consider
the case when the incentive constraint after a good signal binds. Then, E[S(; s; R)] =
  ((s)A+ (1  (s))AP) < 0. A contradiction with (77). Second, consider the case when
the incentive constraint after a good signal is slack. Then, IC(s) = 0. Using LL(; s; R) = 0
and IC(s) = 0 in (70) and LL(; s; R) > 0 and IC(s) = 0 in (71), we have
u0( + B(; s)) < u0( + B(; s))
implying that B(; s) > B(; s). So, we have:
B(; s) > B(; s) =  pS(; s; R)  (1  p)S(; s; 0) [using binding feasibility constraint]
= p [(s)A+ (1  (s))AR] + (1  p)(s)A [using binding LL constraints in state s]
= (s)A+ p(1  (s))AR > 0 (78)
Now, there are two cases to consider: either the limited liability constraint in state (; s; R)
binds or it is slack. If it binds, then B(; s) = (s)A + (1   (s))AR > 0. Together with
(78), this implies that E[B(; s; R)] > 0, a contradiction with (77). If the limited liability
constraint in state (; s; R) is slack, then (; s; R) = 0. Then, there is full risk-sharing after
a good signal,  + B(; s; R) =  + B(; s; R), and B(; s; R) = B(; s; R) +  > 0.
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Together with (78), this implies that E[B(; s; R)] =  E[S(; s; R)] > 0, a contradiction
with (77).
Hence, we showed that at least one of the LL(; s; R)s must be zero. We now show
that it is LL in state (; s; R). Suppose not, i.e., LL(; s; R) > 0 and LL(; s; R) = 0.
Using LL(; s; R) = 0 in (73), it follows that LL(; s; 0) = 0 and IC(s) = 0. Using
LL(
; s; R) > 0 and IC(s) = 0 in (73), it follows that LL(; s; 0) > 0. Hence,
B(; s) = p ((s)A+ (1  (s))AR) + (1  p)(s)A (79)
Using LL(; s; R) > 0 and LL(; s; R) = 0 in (71), we have u
0(+B(; s)) > u0(+B(; s));
implying that  + B(; s) <  + B(; s). Since  > , this means that
B(; s) < B(; s) (80)
must hold. However, we also have that
B(; s) =  pS(; s; R)  (1  p)S(; s; 0) [using binding feasibility constraint]
 p ((s)A+ (1  (s))AR) + (1  p)(s)A [using limited liability constraints]
= B(; s) [using (79)]
which contradicts (80). Hence, we must have that LL(; s; R) = 0.
Fifth, we claim that LL(; s; 0) = 0 and IC(s) = 0. This claim follows immediately
from substituting LL(; s; R) = 0 in (73).
QED
Proof of Proposition 9
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian from the proof of Proposition 8 with respect
to (s) and (s) are
0 (s)  1 (s)
A
+ IC(s)(1  P) = prob[s] (R  C   1) + (R  1)LL(; s; R) (81)
LL(; s; 0) +
0 (s)  1 (s)
A
= prob[s] (pR  1) + (R  1)LL(; s; R) (82)
where we have used LL(; s; R) = 0, LL(; s; R) = 0, LL(; s; 0) = 0 and IC(s) = 0 (all
shown in the previous Proposition).
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Consider rst state s. The right-hand side of (81) is strictly positive since R   C > 1
and  > 0 (see Proposition 8). If the incentive constraint is slack after a good signal, then
IC(s) = 0 , implying that 0 (s) > 0 must hold and 
(s) = 0. Similarly, if P  1, then
0 (s) > 0 must hold and 
(s) = 0.
Consider now state s. Using IC(s) = 0 (as shown in the previous Proposition) in (73)
yields
LL(; s; 0) =
1  p
p
LL(; s; R)
Substituting for LL(; s; 0) in (82) yields
0 (s)  1 (s)
A
= (pR  1)

prob[s] +
LL(; s; R)
p

(83)
If pR  1, then the right-hand side of (83) is non-negative, implying that 0 (s)  0 and
(s) = 0. If pR < 1, then the right-hand side of (83) is negative, implying that 1 (s)) > 0
and (s) = 1. We now claim that the contract with risk-taking and  (s) = 1 is dominated
by the contract with e¤ort after a bad signal. Note that  (s) = 1 is also feasible under the
contract with e¤ort. However, it is never chosen (Proposition 6), implying that the optimal
contract with e¤ort is strictly preferred to the contract with risk-taking and  (s) = 1.
QED
Proof of Proposition 10
The optimal transfers follow from asserting full risk-sharing across all states and using
the binding participation constraint. Condition (35) follows from checking that all limited
liability constraints are satised for these transfers. It remains to check that, in the proposed
contract, the incentive constraint after a good signal is slack and margins are not used. Using
(s) = 0 and the transfers in state s in the incentive constraint (31) we have:
AP > 0 >   (   )    prob[s](1  p)AP =E[B(; s; R)] =  E[S(; s; R)]
so that the incentive constraint after s is indeed slack at (s) = 0. Since pR  1, it is not
optimal to use margins after a bad signal either (Proposition 9).
QED
Proof of Proposition 11
We rst show that for p < max

R C 1
R 1 ;
1
R
	
the contract with e¤ort is optimal. First,
consider p  R C 1
R 1 . In this case, we have that P  1. Combining with condition (36) yields
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AP  A   > (   ): By Lemma 1, the rst-best (which entails e¤ort) is reached.
Second, consider p < 1
R
. By Proposition 9, the contract with e¤ort strictly dominates the
contract with risk-taking in this case.
We now consider the case when p  maxR C 1
R 1 ;
1
R
	
. Note that p must always be lower
than R C
R
since we require that P > 0.
We now show that the expected utility of the contract with e¤ort is decreasing in p.
Consider rst the case when the limited liability constraint in state (; s) is slack. Then,
there is full risk-sharing conditional on the signal and, using Proposition 5, the expected
utility of the protection buyer under e¤ort is given by
prob[s]u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

+
prob[s]u

E[~js] + A [(s) + (1  (s))P ]

The derivative of the expected utility with respect to p is given by
  prob[s]u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

prob[s]
prob[s]
A(1 (s))@P
@p
+
prob[s]u

E[~js] + A [(s) + (1  (s))P ]

A(1  (s))@P
@p
= prob[s]A(1  (s))@P
@p

u

E[~js] + A [(s) + (1  (s))P ]

  u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

where we have used the envelope theorem to claim @
(s)
@p
= 0. We know that 1  (s) > 0
since (s) < 1 (Proposition 6). Due to the binding incentive constraint after a bad signal
(Proposition 4), the protection buyers consumption is larger after a good signal than after a
bad signal implying that the term in the square brackets above is positive. Since P = R  C
1 p ,
we have @P
@p
< 0 implying that the expected utility under e¤ort decreases in p when the limited
liability constraint in state (; s) is slack.
Now consider the other possibility, i.e., that the limited liability constraint in state (; s)
is binding. Then, there is still full risk-sharing conditional on a good signal but there is no
longer full risk-sharing conditional on a bad signal. Using Proposition 5, the expected utility
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of the protection buyer is given by
prob[s]u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

+
 (1  )u

 + (s)A  (1  (s))A(1  )R  P


+(1  )u ( + (s)A+ (1  (s))AR)
The derivative of the expected utility with respect to p is given by
  prob[s]u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

prob[s]
prob[s]
A(1 (s))@P
@p
+
 (1  )

u

 + (s)A  (1  (s))A(1  )R  P


A(1 (s))@P
@p
= prob[s]A(1 (s))@P
@p

u

 + (s)A  (1  (s))A(1  )R  P


  u

E[~js]  prob[s]A [
(s) (R  C) + (1  (s))P ]
prob[s]

where we used (1 )

=prob[s] and we again made use of the envelope theorem to claim
@(s)
@p
= 0. Since (s) < 1 (Proposition 6), 1 (s) > 0. Using (56), and the fact that the
limited liability constraints in states (; s) and (; s) are always slack (Proposition 2) and the
incentive constraint after a bad signal binds (Proposition 4), we have that u
 
 + (; s)

>
u
 
 + (; s)

or, equivalently, that the term in the square brackets above is positive. Since
@P
@p
< 0, the expected utility under e¤ort decreases in p when the limited liability constraint
in state (; s) is binding.
We now show that the expected utility of the contract with risk-taking is increasing in
p. Under risk-taking, the consumption of the protection buyer is equalized across all states.
Therefore, using the optimal transfers from Proposition 10 in (26), the expected utility
of the protection buyer under no e¤ort is given by: u

E[~]  prob[s](1  p)AP

. Using
(1   p)AP = R   C   pR, we have that the derivative of the expected utility with respect
to p is given by
prob[s]ARu

E[~]  prob[s](1  p)AP

> 0
Lastly, note that as p ! R C
R
(or, equivalently, as P ! 0), the expected utility under
risk-taking is strictly higher than the expected utility under e¤ort. This is because the
expected utility under risk-taking is approaching u

E[~]

, which is the rst-best level of
utility, while the expected utility under e¤ort is strictly smaller than the rst-best level of
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utility since AP < (   ) and hence it is not possible to reach the rst-best with e¤ort
after bad news (Lemma 1).
In sum, for p < max

R C 1
R 1 ;
1
R
	
, the contract with e¤ort is optimal. For p! R C
R
, the
contract with risk-taking is optimal. For max

R C 1
R 1 ;
1
R
	  p < R C
R
, the expected utility
under e¤ort is decreasing in p while the expected utility under risk-taking is increasing in p.
Therefore, there exists a threshold value of p, denoted by p^, such that e¤ort after bad news
is optimal if and only if p  p^.
QED
Proof of Proposition 12
With protection seller e¤ort, there is full risk-sharing conditional on the realization of
the signal ~s and we can write the objective function (6) as
U = prob[s]u(E[~ + B(~; ~s)j~s = s]) + prob[s]u(E[~ + B(~; ~s)j~s = s]): (84)
Using the binding incentive and participation constraints, equations (15) and (16) express
the expected transfer to protection buyers conditional on the signal, E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s] and
E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s], as a function of the margin (s) (recall that there is no margin call after a
good signal). Writing the problem in terms of the expected transfers after a signal simplies
the exposition of the proof.
The rst partial derivative of the objective function with respect to the margin is (for
notational ease, we drop the reference to the s in (s)):
@U
@
= prob[s]
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
u0 + prob[s]
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
u0; (85)
where u0 and u denote the marginal utility conditional on the bad and the good signal,
respectively. The partial derivative of the expected transfer after a bad signal with respect
to the margin is
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
= A [1  P() + (1  )P 0()] : (86)
When the derivative is positive, margins relax the incentive constraint. Dene
X  1  P() + (1  )P 0() (87)
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The derivative is positive if and only if X > 0. This is condition (46) in the text.
The partial derivative of the expected transfer after a good signal with respect to the
margin is
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
=  prob[s]
prob[s]
A [(R  C   1) +X] (88)
The derivative is negative when X > 0 since R   C > 1 (condition (2)). When X < 0,
then the derivative may either be positive or negative, depending on how X compares to the
opportunity cost of margins, R  C   1.
Combining (86), (87) and (88), we can write (85) as
@U
@
= prob[s]Au0

u0
u0
 

R  C   1
X
+ 1

X
When X > 0 then @U
@
= 0 yields the condition for an optimal interior margin in the
proposition (when X < 0 then @U
@
< 0 for sure since u
0
u0  1). (Note that as in the linear cost
case, it may be optimal not to use margins).
We now show that when  < 0, then the optimization problem may not be well-behaved.
The second partial derivative of the objective function (84) with respect to margins is
@2U
@2
= prob[s]
24u00 @E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
!2
+ u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@2
35
+ prob[s]
24u00 @E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
!2
+ u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@2
35
The rst term in each squared bracket is negative (because of concave utility). A su¢ cient
condition for a local maximum is therefore
prob[s]u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@2
+ prob[s]u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@2
 0
Using (86), (87) and (88) the condition becomes
prob[s]A
@X
@
(u0   u0)  0:
Since u0   u0  0 (protections buyers may bear signal risk), the su¢ cient condition holds
when @X
@
 0 or, equivalently, when   0. When  < 0 we cannot be sure that the
rst-order condition identies a local maximum.
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Finally, note that when   0 then 1 > R  c
1 p is su¢ cient for X > 0 for all .
QED
Proof of Proposition 13
The rst-order condition stipulates @U(
;)
@
= 0 (for simplicity we consider only interior
solutions,  2 (0; 1)). After total di¤erentiation of this implicit function we obtain
d
d
=  
@2U
@@
@2U
@2
When  is a local maximum, then a more convex cost of e¤ort leads to larger optimal
margins, d

d
> 0, if and only if @
2U
@@
> 0. This cross-partial derivative is
@2U
@@
= prob[s]
"
u00
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
+ u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@@
#
+ prob[s]
"
u00
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
+ u0
@2E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@@
#
Using (86), (87) and (88), the cross-partial derivative becomes
@2U
@@
= prob[s]A"
 u00@E[
B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
[(R  C   1) +X] + u00@E[
B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
X +
@X
@
(u0   u0)
#
Moreover,
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
=
prob[s]
prob[s]
(1  )2A2
1  p > 0
@E[B(~; ~s)j~s = s]
@
=  (1  )
2A2
1  p < 0
@X
@
= 2
(1  )A
1  p > 0
When   0 then  is a local maximum and R   c
1 p < 1 is su¢ cient for X > 0. And
when X > 0, the cross-partial derivative is positive.
QED
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